Administrative capacity, structural choice and the creation of EU agencies
By: CRISTENSEN, Jorgen Gronnegaard
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Contributor(s): NIELSEN, Vibeke Lehmann.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: Oxfordshire : Routledge, mar. 2010Subject(s): Área de Livre Comércio | Governança | Estrutura Organizacional | Regulação | EuropaJournal of European Public Policy 17, 2, p. 176-204Abstract: Since the 1990s the EU has established an ever-increasing number of administrative agencies. Their creation has been seen as a result of policy-makers' acknowledgement of a credible commitment problem where trust in the Commission has gradually eroded. This article systematically tests this credible commitment hypothesis. While finding support for it as a normative ideal informing the Commission's governance strategy, there is little evidence of its acceptance by member countries. Rather the design decisions made in the Council of Ministers conform to the predictions of structural choice theory as there is an inverse relationship between the legal authority delegated to agencies and their formal autonomy
Since the 1990s the EU has established an ever-increasing number of administrative agencies. Their creation has been seen as a result of policy-makers' acknowledgement of a credible commitment problem where trust in the Commission has gradually eroded. This article systematically tests this credible commitment hypothesis. While finding support for it as a normative ideal informing the Commission's governance strategy, there is little evidence of its acceptance by member countries. Rather the design decisions made in the Council of Ministers conform to the predictions of structural choice theory as there is an inverse relationship between the legal authority delegated to agencies and their formal autonomy
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